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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN A
MARKET WITH MORALITY
THOMAS W. DUNFEE*
I
INTRODUCTION
Moral desires are embodied in markets.1  This article analyzes the implica-
tions for corporate governance of the existence of morality within consumer
and capital markets.  Analysis of the role of moral desires within markets rep-
resents a new way of looking at the long-standing debate concerning the social
responsibility of corporations.  The focus of this article is normative, that is, it is
concerned with how managers should act.2
II
THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATION: DOES IT ENCOMPASS MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY?
Competing, mutually exclusive visions exist concerning the ultimate pur-
pose and true nature of the corporation.  Variously described as communitarian
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1. Moral desires, explained more fully herein, are desires pertaining to beliefs about ethically
right and wrong behavior.  Moral desires are equivalent to economic desires for preferred goods and
services at favored prices in the sense that a person will somehow resolve competing desires through a
specific decision.  Thus, she may directly trade off moral and “economic” desires.  The individual may
require a lower price to buy goods that are inconsistent with a moral desire; for example, an animal
lover may decide to buy a deeply discounted cosmetic that has been tested on animals.  In that sense,
the individual “prices” their morality into the decision.  In turn, the decisions of an aggregation of in-
dividuals will reflect the impact of their moral desires—some refusing to buy at all, some requiring a
lower price, others indifferent to the particular moral issue.  This will, in turn, affect the observable
price and quantity of goods and services.  Thus, moral desires become embedded in markets.
2. Most of the principles developed in this article are consistent with extant corporate law.  See
A.A. Sommer, Jr., Comment on Dunfee, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (Summer 1999).  Places
they diverge raise an issue of whether the law should be modified.
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versus contractarian,3 the Berle v. Dodd debate,4 the shareholder paradox,5 or
the separation thesis,6 these differing visions reflect conflicting political and
moral preferences concerning the nature of corporations.7  Most famously, the
debate is reflected in the sharply contrasting views of Milton Friedman8 and his
many critics.9  Ultimately, the basis of the disagreement boils down to a mono-
tonic versus a pluralistic view of corporate objectives.10
A.  The Monotonist/Pluralist Debate
The monotonic view emphasizes maximization of shareholder wealth.
“[S]hareholders claim the corporation’s heart.  This shareholder-centric focus
of corporate law is often referred to as shareholder primacy.”11  The objective
reduces to calculations of short-term results for shareholders.  Legal mandates
must be followed, but most other extra-shareholder considerations are verbo-
ten as reflecting inappropriate social or political considerations, violations of
innate property rights, or, even worse, as a subterfuge that allows managers to
act in furtherance of their own personal interests.  Based upon a view of a cor-
poration as a nexus of contracts, this approach eschews public intervention in
support of nonshareholder obligations.12  Working from a foundation of liberty,
                                                          
3. See generally David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993).
4. See generally A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365
(1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.,  For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145
(1932); A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve?  The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited
Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991).
5. For a discussion of the shareholder paradox, see articles in 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. (Oct. 1994).
6. See R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions, 4 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 409 (1994).
7. Interestingly, the debate is often framed in terms of “social” responsibility, an ambiguous term
open to political interpretations.
8. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32; Willa Johnson, Freedom and Philanthropy: An Interview with
Milton Friedman, 71 BUS. & SOC. REV. 11 (1989).
9. For general background, see PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed.,
1995); Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409 (1993); Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of
Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1990); David Millon, Redefining Corporate
Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991); Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565 (1993).  For a bibliography of communitarian writing, which rejects the
idea of shareholder primacy, see Millon,  supra note 3, at 1391-93.
10. Eric W. Orts, a consistent advocate for a pluralistic view, argues that a “unidimensional eco-
nomic view of corporate law is an incorrect empirical description” and that “[t]he policies underlying
corporate law cannot (and presumably should not) be reduced to a unidimensional value, such as the
economic objective of ‘maximizing shareholders’ wealth.’”  Orts, supra note 9, at 1587.
11. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998) (challenging
the relevancy of the putative norm).
12. For general background, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder
Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Mi-
chael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and Corporate Law: Communitari-
anism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory
Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984 (1993).
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monotonists assume that non-shareholders with an interest in corporate deci-
sions can either explicitly contract to protect their interests,13 or can be treated
as having implicitly contracted with shareholders to represent their interests.14
Milton Friedman is strongly identified with the monotonic position:
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee
of the owners of the business.  He has direct responsibility to his employers.  That re-
sponsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which gener-
ally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of
the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.15
The pluralistic view, on the other hand, emphasizes broader constituencies
or stakeholders of the corporation—variously, bondholders, suppliers, distribu-
tors, creditors, local communities, consumers, users, state and federal govern-
ments, special interest groups, etc.16—and has even been extended by some to
include a general obligation to act consistently with the general needs of soci-
ety.17  This view is supported in two distinct ways.  First, pluralists argue that
management has an ethical obligation to act in furtherance of the interests of
stakeholders.  The obligation is supported by analysis that is based on a specific
ethical theory (for example, Kantian ethics) or on a particularized conception
of justice or rights.  Advocates of ethically based, fiduciary-like obligations to
stakeholders have even gone so far as to ask “[w]hat’s [s]o [s]pecial [a]bout
[s]hareholders?”18  Alternatively, a persuasive argument is made that firms will
be more successful in achieving their primary objective of enhancing share-
holder wealth by adequately reflecting stakeholder interests.19  The pluralistic
view is operationalized in the academic management literature under the rubric
of corporate social responsiveness.  Corporate social responsiveness focuses on
the ability and readiness of a corporation to respond to stakeholders.20  The lit-
                                                          
13. For example, bondholders, distributors, and suppliers may easily contract with the firm to pro-
tect their own economic interests.
14. Maitland argues that the disagreement between monotonists and pluralists boils down to dif-
ferent empirical assumptions.  See Ian Maitland, The Morality of the Corporation: An Empirical or
Normative Disagreement, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 445, 454-55 (1994).  Both sides want to recognize the self-
determination of stakeholders.  See id.  Monotonists conclude that stakeholder self-determination is
reflected in their explicit or implied contracts with the shareholders; pluralists disagree and argue that
public policy must intervene to protect stakeholder self-determination.  See id.
15. See Friedman, supra note 8, at 33.
16. See Millon, supra note 3, at 1378-79.
17. See id. at 1379.  Interestingly, the same divergence of viewpoints is reflected in the 1994 Com-
pany Law in China, which provides a legal framework for the organization and operation of private
stock companies.  See Michael I. Nikkel, Note, “Chinese Characteristics” in Corporate Clothing: Ques-
tions of Fiduciary Duty in China’s Company Law, 80 MINN. L. REV. 503, 522-23 (1995).  The new law
sends mixed messages concerning corporate objectives and governance.  See id. at 523.  Article 102
provides that shareholders “shall be the organ of authority of the company,” while Article 14 provides
that “companies must . . . strengthen the establishment of a socialist spiritual civilization, and accept
the supervision of the government and the public.”  Id.
18. John R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management Relation: Or, What’s So
Special About Shareholders?, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 393, 393 (1994).
19. See generally Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis,  1 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 53 (1991).
20. See generally Edwin M. Epstein, The Corporate Social Policy Process,  29 CAL. MGMT. REV.
99 (1987); Edwin M. Epstein, The Corporate Social Policy Process and the Process of Corporate Gov-
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erature identifies strategies and processes, such as crisis management teams,
that firms can implement to ensure that proper responses occur.
The debate between monotonists and pluralists has run on for decades, and,
while its character and some of the specific issues have changed, it remains es-
sentially a debate over the extent to which corporations should be governed to
achieve objectives other than maximizing shareholder wealth.21  As a starting
point, it should be noted that no serious writings advocate the two extreme po-
sitions on the monotonic-pluralistic continuum.  At one extreme is the position
that nothing should ever constrain shareholder wealth maximization.  At the
other extreme is the position that corporations should be managed solely to
benefit non-shareholder stakeholders.  Rational people do not advocate the po-
sition that corporations have an unconstrained obligation to do whatever it
takes to increase shareholder wealth (for example, hiring a hitman to murder a
key witness against the firm in a major product liability case).  Nor do rational
people expect publicly held corporations to be operated in furtherance of social
or altruistic objectives with little or no concern for the interests of investors.
Where, then, on the continuum does the proper position lie?  Should man-
agers seek to balance the long-term and short-term welfare of shareholders?
Prefer one to the other?  Or toward the opposite end, actively seek to  “balance
the interests of all the firm’s constituencies” in every decision, a position criti-
cized by A. A. Sommer, Jr.22  Part of the reason for the divergence in view-
points concerning corporate responsibility stems from the wide variety of ac-
tivities that fall within its purview. Actions implicating the question of for
whom the corporation is to be managed include such things as (1) engaging in
corporate giving and philanthropy; (2) considering community interests in de-
ciding on plant location or closure; (3) rejecting premiums offered in hostile
takeovers; (4) making products safer than the law requires; and (5) putting in
environmental controls beyond what the law requires. 23
Two cases help to emphasize the types of issues that underlie the monoton-
ist/pluralist debate.
Case 1.  Merck and Mectizan.23  In the late 1970s, Merck scientists
discovered that ivermectin, a drug they produced to control parasites in
animals, might help millions of people afflicted by onchocerciasis.  This disease,
known as river blindness, exists primarily in poorer countries in Africa.  The
                                                          
ernance,  25 AM. BUS. L.J. 361 (1987); William C. Frederick, Toward CSR3: Why Ethical Analysis is
Indispensable and Unavoidable in Corporate Affairs, 28 CAL. MGMT. REV. 126 (1986).
21. The debate has been ably and thoroughly described elsewhere and it is not necessary to go into
greater detail here.  See generally William W. Bratton, The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Criti-
cal Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989); Millon, supra note 3; David Millon, Theories of the
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 210; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997)
(book review).
22. Cindy Schipani & Jim Walsh, The Modern Firm: Is There Liberty and Justice for All?, 28
DIVIDEND 19, 23 (1997) (quoting A.A. Sommer, Jr.)
23. For an elaborate discussion of this case and the decision process at Merck, see DAVID
BOLLIER, BUSINESS ENTERPRISE TRUST, MERCK & CO. (A)-(D) (1991).
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disease is transmitted through black flies, whose bites introduce larvae into a
victim’s body.  The larvae produce offspring, which cause itching so severe
some people have committed suicide.  Eventually, the eyes are affected, often
causing blindness.  Merck incurred great costs in developing the drug; these
costs could not be recouped directly from those who had the disease because
they were too poor to pay a profit-generating price.  Ultimately, Merck spent
ten years developing the drug and then decided to give the drug away without
charge, and even to support financially the distribution of the drug to remote
areas.  The drug provides significant benefits and need only be taken orally
once per year.
Case 2.  Shell Oil and the Brent Spar Rig.  In 1995, Shell proposed to sink a
decommissioned oil rig in the North Sea.  It performed an environmental
impact study and obtained approval from the British government.24
Greenpeace challenged the proposed deep-sea dumping and claimed that
Shell’s solution of sinking the rig would cause serious environmental harm.
Shell disputed the claim on scientific grounds and argued that sinking was the
best available option.25  Because Shell refused to abandon its plans, Greenpeace
surrounded the rig with small boats and even occupied it in 1995.26  Due to
Greenpeace’s pressure and consumer boycotts, Shell foresook its sinking
strategy and towed the rig to a Norwegian fiord where it remained for almost
three years.27  The reversal of the original plan cost Shell considerable
expense.28  After Shell abandoned its dumping plans, independent scientists
investigated and found that Shell had been correct—the environmental impact
from sinking the rig would be “minimal.”29  Greenpeace admitted it was wrong
on that specific claim.30
Both cases involve decisions that may impact shareholder wealth.  Merck
spent millions developing the drug and then incurred even greater costs by
giving it away and supporting the distribution of the drug.  Then-chairman Roy
Vagelos indicated that he spent an enormous amount of time on the project.31
True, such an action might help Merck in hiring and retaining research scien-
tists and could help in its relationship with certain physicians, customers, and
regulators.  On the other hand, few customers may even be aware of Merck’s
action, and the precise benefits are difficult to measure against the clear expen-
ditures the decision cost.  Assuredly, if  Merck were to decide to invest half of
                                                          
24. See Graeme Smith, Precedent Feared as Shell Saves £34m: Atlantic Grave Approved for Giant
Oil Installation, HERALD (Glasgow), Feb. 17, 1995, at 9.
25. See Greenpeace Admits Error Against Shell, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995, at D2.
26. See Shell Oil Platform to Become a Pier,  HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 30, 1998, at 1B.
27. See id.
28. See id.  In January 1998, after considering many disposal proposals, Shell decided to cut up the
rig and make it into a pier in Norway.  See id.  This plan will cost Shell around $42 million, which is
more than twice what it would cost to dump the rig at sea.  See id.
29. See L.A. TIMES, supra note 25, at D2.
30. See id.
31. See DAVID BOLLIER, THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE TRUST, MERCK & COMPANY 11 (1991).
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its research and development budget in likely unprofitable drugs, it would have
a seriously negative impact on shareholder wealth.
Shell ineffectively considered the interests of stakeholders in its decision
process and incurred costs in so doing.  Its efforts were for naught because it
apparently failed to evaluate correctly the likely public reaction to its decision.32
The costs Shell incurred in dealing with the project, coupled with the cost of a
consumer boycott, etc., probably had a negative effect on shareholder wealth.
A more accurate reading of the “moral market” it faced would have benefited
shareholders.
B.  Does Extant Law Resolve the Monotonist/Pluralist Debate?
Assuming that Merck explicitly considered the interests of stakeholders33
and that Shell’s misreading of stakeholder concerns regarding the Brent Spar
cost shareholders money, did the management of the two firms act in violation
of their legal obligations?34  The answer depends on the interpretation of extant
corporate law, particularly the interpretation to be given shareholder primacy.
If one reads into general corporate law a dominating shareholder primacy norm
that focuses only on the decision process and prohibits any consideration of
impacts on stakeholders, then the answer would appear to be that both Merck
and Shell acted improperly in directly considering the interests of stakeholders.
If, instead, the law is interpreted to mean that managers may consider, at least
                                                          
32. Shell U.K. director John Wybrew stated that even after spending four years deciding what to
do with the Brent Spar—which was the technically correct decision—the company failed to understand
the public’s opinion and the international interest the action would attract.  See Roger Cowe, Shell
Chief Laments PR Failure in Move to Dump Brent Spar, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 15, 1995, at 21.
33. This decision may have been made solely in reference to shareholder welfare with the firm
calculating the likely benefits from reputation with future employees, customers, and regulators.  It is
not clear that Merck management considered these factors other than in vague terms; for example,
research on ivermectin might lead to other discoveries.  The better view is that Merck’s primary mo-
tive was to help those afflicted with a horrible condition, regardless of whether it was able to realize
direct profits from the product.
34. “[A] decision that may be rational on purely business grounds is nonetheless subject to invali-
dation if management candidly admits that its motives were other than profit-based.” Kenneth B.
Davis, Jr., Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder Gain: A
Survey of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7, 32 (1988).  Professor
Bainbridge states that corporate law generally holds to the following well-known proposition from
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockhold-
ers. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is
to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in
the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stock-
holders in order to devote them to other purposes. . . .  [I]t is not within the lawful powers of a
board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental
benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefitting others.
Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1424 (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)).
This statement is consistent with the traditional view that any consideration of non-shareholder inter-
ests must be rationally related to improving shareholder welfare.  In some situations, the consideration
of other interests—in the absence of an applicable other constituency statute—may be strictly forbid-
den.  For example, in Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., the court stated that it was inap-
propriate for the Revlon board to justify its actions by stating that it was protecting the corporation’s
noteholders when the company was clearly up for sale.  See 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985).
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in some fashion, how their decisions may benefit or harm stakeholders, then
Merck and Shell acted properly so long as they considered stakeholder interests
in an appropriate manner.  The Merck and Shell cases demonstrate the diffi-
culty in making a definitive assessment of the impact of stakeholder interests
on shareholder wealth.  Shell’s actions likely injured shareholders because
there were identifiable costs, but no clear-cut benefits.  The Merck case is less
clear because arguably, as a result of the enormous favorable publicity Merck
received plus the potential opening of other markets in Africa, Merck reaped a
substantial economic benefit that ultimately redounded to shareholders.  The
questions with Merck are whether the benefits exceeded the unquestionably
significant costs, thereby producing a net benefit to shareholders, and whether
such benefits were reasonably foreseeable at the time the decision was made.
Thus, the implications of the current legal regime depend to some extent on
underlying assumptions concerning the likely effect of managerial considera-
tion of stakeholder interests.  The shareholder primacy norm, if fully incorpo-
rated into the legal regime, would still require that stakeholder interests be
considered when doing so has a foreseeable impact upon shareholder wealth.
The legal debate concerning the proper interpretation of extant corporate law
reflects this empirical uncertainty, with the competing advocates working from
diametrically different assumptions concerning the likely impact of acting on
behalf of stakeholders.35  Unsurprisingly, much of the legal debate pertains to
issues where the potential conflicts of interest between shareholder owners and
agent managers are greatest.36  For example, potential conflicts abound in hos-
tile takeovers, where managers may lose perks, even their jobs, if ownership
                                                          
35. For example, consider the debate between Ronald Green and Stephen Bainbridge.  Green ar-
gues that strict adherence to the monotonist view can cause—or even require—managers to ignore
critical risks to stakeholders if acting on those risks would decrease shareholder wealth.  See Green,
supra note 9, at 1419-21 (arguing that Union Carbide’s managers would have a difficult time justifying
expenditures to take extra safety precautions at their plant in Bhopal, India, which suffered an acci-
dent that killed over 2,000 persons, because the risks of an accident were extremely small and the costs
to improve the facility were great).  Bainbridge, however, argues that management acting on behalf of
stakeholders can cause many problems, including a conflict of interest problem.  See Bainbridge, supra
note 12, at 1446.  Bainbridge also asks the question, “How would I feel about living in a world gov-
erned by the moral rules implicit in the shareholder wealth maximization norm?” and responds “pretty
good.”  Id.  “For many years, the basic rule that shareholder interests come first has governed public
corporations.  That rule has helped produce an economy that is dominated by public corporations,
which in turn has produced the highest standard of living of any society in the history of the world.” Id.
In the business ethics literature, Norman Bowie argues that there are “unenlightened” and
“enlightened” Friedmanites.  See Norman E. Bowie, New Directions in Corporate Social Responsibility,
34 BUS. HORIZONS 56 (1991), reprinted in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 96, 97 (Tom Beauchamp
& Norman E. Bowie eds., 5th ed. 1997).  While both types agree that a corporation exists to earn prof-
its within certain bounds, the unenlightened manager exploits nonshareholder stakeholders to increase
short-term profits, but fails in the long run due to lowered productivity and cooperation of those stake-
holders.  The enlightened Friedmanite manager, however, is concerned with the well-being of all its
stakeholders and is able to sustain or improve long-term performance.
36. Even so, it is surprising that there has not been more debate concerning corporate philan-
thropy.  When a corporation gives money to a senior manager’s alma mater or favorite cultural charity,
a conflict of interest may exist.  The conflict is exacerbated when the gift results in memorializing the
manager, as when a university building or an opera lounge is named for the manager even though the
funds are provided by the firm.  It is possible, of course, that certain donations memorializing a man-
ager may constitute an efficient method of compensation.
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changes hands. The monotonists are properly concerned that, where interests
dramatically diverge, managers may put their own well-being ahead of inves-
tors’.  Managers may act egoistically, concealing their self interest with claims
that they are acting in furtherance of the public good or as compelled by busi-
ness ethics.
Some of the debates between the monotonists and pluralists have focused
on the interpretation of state corporate constituency statutes.37  First adopted in
Pennsylvania in 1983, the majority of states have since enacted them.38  Most
provide that managers and directors may consider the effects of any action on
some broader constituency such as employees, suppliers, customers, communi-
ties, etc.  The statutes generally do not mandate that stakeholder interests be
considered.  Instead, they are merely permissive; management will not be liable
for having demonstrably considered such interests.39  Most of the statutes were
adopted in response to the threat of hostile takeovers40 and were extensively
lobbied for by the management of potential target firms.41  This heritage taints
their status as legitimizing a broadly pluralistic approach to corporate govern-
ance.
Significant issues exist as to how the constituency statutes should be prop-
erly interpreted and enforced.  So long as they cannot be directly enforced by
stakeholder plaintiffs, they will have a limited impact.42  Interestingly, they have
seen surprisingly little use considering the extent to which, at least upon first
impression, they appear to change the substantive law in this area.43  At this
point in time, their apparent direct impact is so limited that they cannot be con-
sidered to have made a change in extant law of sufficient significance to have
resolved the debate.
On the other hand, the fact that the constituency statute regime has had a
limited impact does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the law fully
supports the monotonic approach.  On the contrary, there is substantial support
for the proposition that corporate law allows management to act in furtherance
of many types of interests other than pure short-term shareholder wealth
                                                          
37. See generally Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992).
38. For a list of the states with other constituency statutes, see Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The In-
adequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder
Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 613 n.140, 620 n.171 (1997).
39. Connecticut is an exception in that it requires consideration of nonshareholder interests.  See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-133(e) (West Supp. 1993); Leung, supra note 38, at 619.
40. See Orts, supra note 37, at 24.
41. Orts notes that certain labor unions also lobbied for constituency statutes.  See id. at 24-25.
This fact mitigates the common wisdom that they are purely management self-interest statutes.  See id.
42. For a discussion of the unenforceability of constituency statutes due to a failure to give non-
shareholders standing to enforce a claim, see Rima Fawal Hartman, Situation-Specific Fiduciary Duties
for Corporate Directors: Enforceable Obligations or Toothless Ideals?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1761,
1778-87 (1993); Gary von Stange, Corporate Social Responsibility through Constituency Statutes: Leg-
end or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 488 (1994); Leung, supra note 38, at 617-18; Orts, supra note
37, at 55.
43. See generally Orts, supra note 37, at 44, 92 (noting that corporate constituency statutes may
not really be a change in corporate law).
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maximization.44  The American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) Principles on Corpo-
rate Governance explicitly approves of managerial actions that are “made on
the basis of ethical considerations even when doing so would not enhance cor-
porate profit or shareholder gain.”45  The most well-established use of corpo-
rate funds that does not ipso facto enhance shareholder wealth—charitable do-
nations—is approved by statute in every state.46  In general, the business
judgment rule gives management broad discretion in what interests they choose
to further, so long as managers can present a rational basis for the claim that
their business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.47  In conclu-
sion, the current legal regime does not appear to provide a definitive resolution
to the monotonist/pluralist debate.  Instead, as is true of so much U.S. law, its
prophylactic nature allows it to evolve in a manner consistent with changing
moral and political expectations.
C.  Claims That There is No Real Debate Between Monotonists and Pluralists
Before analyzing the nature of morality that exists in markets and its impli-
cations for corporate governance, it is necessary to consider two arguments to
the effect that there is not really a substantive disagreement between the mono-
tonists and pluralists after all—that is, that when properly framed, their view-
points converge.  Neither argument, however, appears to dispose of the issue.
The first argument is based upon empirical assumptions concerning the ef-
fect of a pluralistic approach on shareholder wealth.  Although shadowed in the
legal literature,48 it is within the business ethics literature that the debate
whether there is a true separation between obligations owed to shareholders
and stakeholders has reached full extension.49  There, those who deny the exis-
tence of a separation argue that proper consideration of stakeholder interests
resolves any potential conflicts because such actions will also benefit share-
                                                          
44. As Solomon puts it, “[t]oday in the Anglo-American legal system, corporations have consider-
able flexibility in undertaking socially responsible activities.”  Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of
Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics by Modern Public Held Corporations: A Critical Assess-
ment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1625, 1626 (1993).
45. Smith, supra note 11, at 290 (quoting AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 cmt. h (1994)).
46. For a list of the state statutes, see Edward Adams & Karl Knutsen, A Charitable Corporate
Giving Justification for the Socially Responsible Investment of Pension Funds: A Populist Argument for
the Public Use of Private Funds, 80 IOWA L. REV. 211, 232 (1995).  For a discussion of issues raised by
corporate philanthropy, see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the
Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997).
47. See Davis, supra note 34, at 22-23 (stating that the law faces many hurdles in “developing
meaningful limits on management’s discretion to pass off voluntarism as enlightened long-term profit-
making”).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 33-47.
49. The debate has centered on the existence of a “paradox” for managers who must simultane-
ously satisfy stakeholder claims and maximize value for the shareholder owners.  See generally Ken-
neth E. Goodpaster & Thomas E. Holloran, In Defense of a Paradox, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 423 (1994);
Boatright, supra note 18; Freeman, supra note 6.  Boatright, for example, seeks to resolve the paradox
by suggesting that managers may consider stakeholder claims independent of shareholder interests
only when management does not have a direct fiduciary obligation to shareholders.  See generally
Boatright, supra note 18.
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holders.  They believe that when management astutely responds to stakeholder
interests, such actions either will be in the best long-term interests of share-
holders or will be otherwise legally or morally compelled.
Akin to selling ethics on the ground that it enhances profitability, the view
that shareholder and stakeholder interests invariably converge is based upon
highly optimistic assumptions concerning potential congruence between the in-
terests of stakeholders and shareholders.  Divergence of interests between
stakeholders and shareholders disappears, if at all, solely on the basis of a
highly circumscribed view of the pluralist position.  Only when the pluralist
strategy is limited to those win-win actions—where there is a clear congruence
between stakeholder and shareholder interests—can one claim to eliminate
conflicting interests.  In the everyday life of corporate managers, trade-offs be-
tween the interests of different corporate constituencies arise regularly.50  Busi-
ness life is not somehow miraculously limited to win-win decisions.  Many po-
tentially socially responsive activities may be implemented in such a way as to
have a substantial negative impact on the wealth interests of shareholders: for
example, the payment of significantly above-market wages to employees.  As
long as that is possible, and until there is clear agreement on the parameters of
proper corporate behavior, the issue—or paradox—remains relevant for our
purposes.
The second argument is nicely summed up by Easterbrook and Fischel:
“What is the goal of the corporation?  Is it profit, and for whom?  Social wel-
fare more broadly defined? . . . Our response to such questions is: Who
cares?”51  Easterbrook and Fischel go on to give the examples where the New
York Times decides that it wants to publish a newspaper without considering
shareholder returns, and a bank decides that its priority will be lending to mi-
nority-owned businesses or third world countries.  So long as there is full dis-
closure to investors,52 they do not see a problem.
This argument requires a return to the actual language used by Milton
Friedman.  What exactly does Friedman mean by the phrase “while conforming
to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embod-
ied in ethical custom”?53  Interpreted broadly, this language, particularly the
reference to ethical custom, could be used to justify substantial recognition of
stakeholder interests.  Interpreted narrowly, the language would only reflect
the truism that corporations must act in conformity with the law, and that firms
need only conform with clear-cut obligations of honesty and promise-keeping.
There does not appear to be support in the monotonist literature for the broad
                                                          
50. The trade-offs can be between stakeholder and shareholder interests, or among stakeholder
interests themselves when different groups of stakeholders hold mutually exclusive positions.
51. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 35-36.
52. One can envision a risk factor in a prospectus that states “management intends to be totally
indifferent to returns to shareholders.”
53. Friedman, supra note 8, at 33.
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interpretation of this language,54 although, as might be expected, pluralists ad-
vocate such a reading.55  The narrow interpretation does not, of course, resolve
the monotonist/pluralist dispute.
Whether participants in capital and consumer markets have moral desires
that they do and should try to implement in their marketplace decisions is rele-
vant to the discussion of the proper role and function of the corporation.  If
such morality is present in markets, then what effect should it have?  Is it actu-
ally discernible in some objective sense?  If so, then should firms pay some at-
tention to morality in markets?56  Is it desirable that people act in this way?  Be-
fore seeking to answer these questions and connect the conclusions to the
debate about the nature of the firm, it is first necessary to discuss what is meant
by the existence of morality in markets.
III
MORALITY IN MARKETS
Surely moral desires57 influence the preferences of participants in markets.
Moral desires pertain to personal beliefs concerning right and wrong behavior
                                                          
54. The argument given by Easterbrook and Fischel could have broad implications.  To what ex-
tent do firms act in a manner consistent with their examples of the New York Times and community
banks?  Do they really mean to open their analysis to this extent?  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 12, at 35-36.  Friedman also is confusing on this issue:
I would appeal to individuals, when they are spending their own money, to look at the thing
from the point of view of supporting the kind of ideas they believe in.  There is nothing wrong
with that, if I believe in a certain religion or a certain political view, there is nothing wrong
with my spending my money to promote that.  We want competition in the market for ideas
as well as in the market for goods, but we don’t want to get the two mixed up.
Johnson, supra note 8, at 15 (interviewing Friedman).  It is not clear, at least to me, what he intends by
warning against getting the two “mixed up.”
55. Christopher Stone has criticized Friedman for not seriously considering those rules embodied
in ethical custom, or perhaps Friedman considers them to be synonymous.  See CHRISTOPHER STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 76 (1975).  For example,
Friedman asks whether a corporation is to make expenditures to reduce pollution “beyond the amount
that is in the best interest of the corporation or that is required by law.”  Friedman, supra note 8, at 33.
Friedman states that making that expenditure “for a general social interest” would be spending some-
one else’s money.  Id.  Stone, however, argues that a different conclusion may be reached if the rules of
ethical custom are considered.  See STONE, supra, at 76-77.
Norman Bowie also suggests that the rules of ethical custom could place duties on a Friedmanite
manager “to not cause avoidable harms, or to honor individual stakeholder rights, or to adhere to the
ordinary canons of justice.”  Bowie, supra note 35, at 97.  Bowie, however, also cites the views of Al-
bert Carr and Theodore Levitt, who believe that it is not the ethical customs of society in general, or
“ordinary morality,” that matter, but the distinct standards of business.  For example, Carr likens bus i-
ness’s ethics to those of poker, where deception, concealment, and ignoring friendships is what mat-
ters.
56. “Corporations which exist solely to maximize profit become disconnected from their soul—the
spiritual interconnectedness of humanity.”  BEN & JERRY’S, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1991), re-
printed in Solomon, supra note 44, at 1625.
57. Elsewhere I have defined moral desires as pertaining to personal beliefs concerning right and
wrong.  See generally Thomas W. Dunfee, The Marketplace of Morality: Small Steps Toward a Theory
of Moral Choice, 8 BUS. ETHICS Q. 127 (1998).
[They] may be based in religious, ethical or sociopolitical convictions.  Examples include ob-
servance of religious dietary laws or a religious-based refusal to accept any form of medical
assistance.  [Moral desires] may reflect a belief that it is wrong to discriminate on the basis of
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for oneself and for others and may be contrasted with purely economic desires
to obtain desired goods and services at the lowest possible price.  Individuals
make daily trade-offs between their moral desires and other desires.  Factors
such as one’s emotional state may affect the trade-offs in a given decision.  One
may pass by a homeless person on Monday and give money to the same person
on Tuesday.  Moral desires will often be implicated in the context of business-
relevant decisions.  Moral desires may encompass refusing to do business with
someone deemed to be unfair, boycotting certain firms on the basis of identifi-
cation of the firm with disfavored policies, and so on.
By internally pricing moral desires against other interests, individuals make
decisions influenced by moral desires that are reflected in market outcomes.
That is, the quantity and prices of certain goods may be influenced by moral
desires.  The question for our purposes is the likely amplitude of such an ef-
fect.58  Are there, for example, identifiable contexts in which the price and
quantity of goods and services sold are influenced by moral desires?  It seems
quite plausible to claim that some people trade off moral desires against desires
for good quality and low price in their own decisionmaking.  Across the uni-
verse of those acting on the basis of moral desires, some will hold opposing
moral desires (for example, those supporting animal rights and those believing
in God-granted dominion over animals), and some marketplace actions based
on moral desires will cancel the effect of those acting on the opposite desires.59
Moral desires may have an influence in a variety of circumstances.  Familiar
capital market examples include buying mutual funds that engage in social
screening, or screening personal investments (for example, people refusing to
own tobacco or gambling stocks).  Some pension funds eschew securities of cer-
tain firms, often on the basis of social criteria that presumably reflect the pref-
                                                          
gender or sexual preferences.  [They] may be motivated by a hope for salvation, by an inter-
est in leading a virtuous life, or by a more immediate need for approval by peers.
Id. at 129.  The term “desires” is used to describe a broad set of utilities going beyond traditional eco-
nomic factors.  Id.  The definition of preferences given by Bowles—”[p]references are reasons for be-
havior, that is, attributes of individuals that (along with their beliefs and capacities) account for the
actions they take in a given situation”—is fully consistent with the use of the term “desires” herein.
Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic
Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 75, 78 (1998).
58. Richard Posner appears willing to recognize the existence of some morality in the market but
refuses to believe that it ever would have much of an impact:  “[P]eople seem to behave morally in
situations in which the costs of behaving morally are small, but to respond to incentives in situations in
which those costs are large.”  RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 195 (1990).
Messick’s observation that ethics is not the only thing that matters is unquestionably true.  See gener-
ally David M. Messick, Why Ethics is Not the Only Thing that Matters , 6 BUS. ETHICS Q. 223 (1996).  It
is hard to imagine serious advocacy of either extreme position:  Ethics never matters; only ethics mat-
ters.
59. A personal example helps to demonstrate.  When the civil rights movement reached West Vir-
ginia in the early 1960s, my parents, who had patronized a cafeteria in my hometown, stopped eating
there when the cafeteria remained segregated.  They changed long-standing habits to reflect their sup-
port for integration.  Parents of a neighbor, who rarely had eaten at the cafeteria but who supported
segregation, started eating there regularly while the cafeteria was under pressure to integrate.  The
issue of whether a desire for segregation can be characterized as a “moral desire” is discussed briefly
infra at note 68.
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erences of their beneficiaries.60  Although the total impact of all forms of
screening is hard to measure, the Social Investor Forum estimated that the
amount invested in socially screened mutual funds increased from $650 billion
in 1996 to $1.18 trillion in 1997.61  Some critics of socially screened investing as-
sume that there is, or should be, a single, universal definition of socially respon-
sible investing.  For example, Hylton points out a “persistent inability on the
part of all participants in the debate to develop a simple, coherent definition of
what is meant by socially responsible investing,” while noting with some dismay
that many funds purporting to engage in the practice have little in common.62
Hylton’s dismay is consistent with the idea that there is a single exogenous
definition of what constitutes socially responsible behavior.  That is not the
way, however, that the market works.  With adequate disclosure, some inves-
tors will be influenced by their own moral desires.  Thus, one person might buy
a fund that eschews firms that violate the MacBride Principles in Northern
Ireland, while another investor might be totally indifferent to the MacBride is-
sue and, instead, might detest firms that cater to those with addictions.  The lat-
ter investor might buy a screened fund that excludes tobacco and gambling
stocks, yet hold securities of firms that violate the MacBride principles.
Similar actions are found in consumer markets.  Consumers support their
desires for a clean environment by paying more for pollution-reducing gasoline
even though they are not required by law to purchase it.63  Similarly, sales of
Star Kist tuna increased when it switched to suppliers that protected dolphins,
even though the switch caused higher prices.64  Firms such as the Body Shop,
Tom’s of Maine, and Ben & Jerry’s target the moral desires of potential cus-
tomers by engaging in social-cause marketing.  Such firms seek to identify with
particular social causes, such as saving whales, as a means of attracting consum-
ers who want to support those causes.  Consumers may choose to do business
with them solely on the basis of an assumed alignment of moral preferences.
They may even be willing to pay a higher price or accept less desirable goods to
support a favored cause through their purchasing decisions.  The recent growth
of these strategies is reflected in the $535 million that corporations donated in
                                                          
60. So long as there is full disclosure and the screening is demonstrably consistent with the overall
desires of the beneficiaries, it is consistent with the idea of morality in markets, and as will be argued,
infra, a highly desirable phenomenon.  Individuals who do not want social policies to govern how their
pension funds are invested can leave the firm or work to modify the pension fund’s investment policy.
61. See R. Bruce Hutton et al., Socially Responsible Investing: Growing Issues and New Opportu-
nities, 37 BUS. & SOC. 281, 288 (1998).
62. Maria O’Brien Hylton, “Socially Responsible” Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an
Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992).
63. See Harold H. Kassarjian, Incorporating Ecology into Marketing Strategy: The Case of Air
Pollution, 35 J. MARKETING 61, 65 (1971).  “Within six weeks after the introduction of the [pollution-
reducing] gasoline, more than half of the population had paid an additional two to 12 cents per gallon
to try the new brand.” Id.
64. See Robert H. Frank, Can Socially Responsible Firms Survive in a Competitive Environment?,
in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 86, 95 (David M. Messick
& Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
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1997 to well-known charities in exchange for the right to associate their names
with the charities’ causes in marketing campaigns.65
Consumers may also participate in boycotts to show disapproval of a firm’s
actions.  Examples include negative consumer reaction to Shell’s failure to in-
tercede to prevent the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa in Nigeria, Nestles’ mar-
keting practices to sell infant formula in developing countries, and Exxon’s
handling of the Valdez oil spill.  Daniel Kahneman et al. found that individuals
were willing to incur additional costs, such as traveling a greater distance, to
punish a retailer who, in their opinion, acted unfairly by trying to take advan-
tage of scarcity.66
Robert Frank found similar effects in labor markets.  Frank identified the
existence of a compensating wage premium for less altruistic jobs.67  Frank gives
as examples the large salary gaps between profit and nonprofit jobs, corporate
and public interest law, and expert witnesses for the tobacco companies and
those for the opposition public interest groups.68  Job searchers may select
among competing employment offers on the basis of the perceived moral envi-
ronment of the prospective employers.
Thus, the claim that there is morality in markets in the sense that some
market participants are influenced by their own moral desires seems easily
supportable.69  For most markets, it may be that price and quality considera-
tions dominate, but, for certain markets, moral desires may dominate. Atti-
tudes about morality may influence decisions about such products and services
as furs, certain types of drugs, prostitution, or even the scalping of sports and
entertainment tickets.
                                                          
65. See Thomas A. Fogarty, Corporations Use Causes for Effect, USA TODAY, Nov. 10, 1997, at
7B.
66. See Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
728, 735 ( 1986).
67. See Frank, supra note 64, at 96.
68. Frank also contrasts attitudes toward being a lawyer for the National Rifle Association
(“NRA”) and being a lawyer for the Sierra Club.  See id.  This observation is apparently based on the
assumption that most people would prefer to work for the Sierra Club than the NRA.  But there may
be people whose moral desires favor the right to own and use guns and who, consistent with the ap-
proach taken in this article, would be willing to work for the NRA for a lower salary than they would
require to work for Handgun Control.  Moral desires come in all hues and tones in the overall market,
and, within the overall market, the effect may be to cancel out the impact of particular competing de-
sires.  Some “moral” desires in the market, such as the example given earlier of a preference for racial
segregation, may violate universal moral principles, or hypernorms as discussed infra.  In many in-
stances they will be canceled out by contrary preferences, as was the case in the example of civil rights
in West Virginia; however, even if they come to dominate and become a community norm, they are
nonetheless illegitimate because they violate hypernorms.
69. I am not making the claim that morality itself should be viewed as the output of a market.
There are some interesting possibilities, however, in thinking of morality in market terms.  There may
be certain moral issues, such as the use of severance packages in downsizing, the use of animals in
medical research, and even abortion, where the input of competing moral desires operates in a manner
similar to if not totally congruent with a market.  In such a context, one could consider the demand fac-
tor to be a demand for resolution of the particular moral conflict.  The supply is the competing moral
desires as reflected in a variety of capital, consumer, labor, and political market contexts.  The out-
come is the number of abortions, the typical size of severance packages, the number of animals used in
research, and so on.  These ideas are tentatively explored in Dunfee, supra note 57.
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The use of economic analysis to consider various dimensions of human in-
teraction reinforces the claim that there is a discernible morality in markets.
Gary Becker is a leading practitioner of this relatively new art.70  He uses a very
broad analysis of tastes and preferences, including such things as personal and
social capital pertaining to future consumption,71 a discount of the future,72 and
desires for things such as religiosity or health.73  In so doing, Becker explicitly
recognizes that individuals may attempt to satisfy what are here called moral
desires, in their decisions concerning current consumption.  Even some of the
assumptions underlying Richard Posner’s controversial analysis of human
sexuality and sexual practices is consistent with this core idea. 74
IV
THE IMPLICATIONS OF MARKETPLACE MORALITY FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
If marketplace morality has discernible effects on relevant consumer and
capital markets, then even a straightforward monotonic analysis requires that
management consider it carefully.  Otherwise, managers will not maximize the
potential return to shareholders because they will fail to appreciate fully the
preferences of investors and consumers.  However, for our purposes, the ulti-
mate question is whether there is discernible marketplace morality that re-
quires management to take actions inconsistent with the monotonic approach
to corporate governance.
A.  Does Marketplace Morality Support Monotonists or Pluralists?
Before answering the ultimate question, we must first determine whether
marketplace morality supports either the monotonic or pluralistic approach to
corporate governance.75  If it does, then the framework of analysis is deter-
mined.  If there is support for the monotonist position, then the straightforward
norm of shareholder primacy is ethically required.  If, instead, there is support
for a pluralist position, then more analysis is required to determine which plu-
ralistic vision is supported by marketplace morality.  Survey data on this point
is limited, although some appears to support the pluralistic position.  One mas-
                                                          
70. See generally GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996); GARY S. BECKER &
GUITY NASHAT BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF LIFE (1997).
71. Personal capital refers to “relevant past consumption and other personal experiences that af-
fect current and future utilities,” while social capital refers to “the influence of past actions by peers
and others in an individual’s social network.”  BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES, supra note 70, at
4.
72. See id. at 10-12.
73. See id. at 5-6.
74. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
75. One could engage in a political analysis to determine whether the political system has some-
how dictated that pluralistic values should be observed.  It is well beyond the scope of this article, but
there is obviously a question of how effective the political system is in giving effect to the moral desires
of any relevant group of people.
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sive study of more than 15,000 middle managers from twelve countries posed
the Friedman question directly:
Which of these opinions do you think most other people in your own country would
think better represents the goals of a company, (a) or (b)?
(a)  The only real goal of a company is making profit.
(b)  A company, besides making profit, has a goal of attaining the well-being of  
various stakeholders, such as employees, customers, etc.76
In no country did a majority of managers agree with the first answer.  The
United States had the highest percentage of agreement at forty percent.77
These results are consistent with an earlier survey which found that managers
at all levels consistently ranked the general public as more important than
shareholders.78
It is common for U.S. and global business groups representing senior man-
agers to directly reject the Friedman formulation of the monotonic approach.
For example, the United States Business Roundtable has stated that
“[c]orporations are chartered to serve both their shareholders and society as a
whole. . . . The other stakeholders in the corporation are its employees, cus-
tomers, suppliers, creditors, the communities where the corporation does busi-
ness, and society as a whole.”79  The well-known and widely accepted principles
offered by the global Caux Round Table stress stakeholder obligations
throughout by emphasizing responsibilities toward customers, employees, sup-
pliers, social/political communities, and even, controversially, competitors.80
Monotonists might be expected to question whether these statements represent
genuine positions of significant business groups and to claim that the state-
ments are merely motivated by a public relations strategy.81  One would expect
that the general public would have an even stronger preference against the mo-
notonic positions, preferring instead that corporate managers seek to act con-
sistently with unambiguous popular morality.
A precise, uncontroversial resolution of the relationship between market-
place morality and the monotonist/pluralist debate is probably not feasible at
this time.  Furthermore, as has been stressed, marketplace morality may change
over time.  Nor is a definitive resolution necessary to our analysis.  Instead, it is
possible to identify alternative frameworks, depending on the nature of mar-
ketplace morality within a given community.
                                                          
76. CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER & ALFONS TROMPENAARS, THE SEVEN CULTURES OF
CAPITALISM 32 (1993) (order of question and answers is reversed in original).
77. See id.
78. See Barry Z. Posner & Warren H. Schmidt, Values and the American Manager: An Update, 26
CAL. MGMT. REV. 202, 207 (1984).
79. Orts, supra note 37, at 21.
80. See CAUX ROUND TABLE, PRINCIPLES FOR BUSINESS (1995).  The Caux Round Table is an
organization comprised of very senior executives from Asia, Europe, and the United States.  It takes
its name from its practice of holding its annual meetings at the Mountain House in Caux, Switzerland.
81. Or they might see them as part of an agency problem in which senior management is seeking
cover for self-serving violations of its obligations to shareholders.
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B.  Justifications for Respecting Marketplace Morality
Two basic justifications for incorporating the consideration of marketplace
morality into corporate governance are offered—one normative and one in-
strumental.  First, the normative justification relies upon a hypothetical global
social contract that requires managers to identify and act consistently with le-
gitimate ethical norms found in the communities in which their firms operate.
Thomas Donaldson and I have elaborated at length upon this social contract in
a theory we have called Integrative Social Contracts Theory (“ISCT”),82 which
is grounded in the familiar idea that social norms serve as a foundation for rules
of behavior in communities.  Donaldson and I hypothesize that rational global
contractors seek a moral background essential to sustain productive business,
and, at the same time, retain the ability to select their own values and moral
rules to the greatest extent possible.  There are four key terms in the global so-
cial contract.  The first two are as follows: “Local economic communities pos-
sess moral free space in which they may generate ethical norms for their mem-
bers through microsocial contracts.  Norm-generating microsocial contracts
must be grounded in consent, buttressed by the rights of individual members to
exercise voice and exit.”83
Communities are at the core of the macrosocial contract.  A community is
defined in ISCT as a self-defined, self-circumscribed group of people who in-
teract in the context of shared tasks, values, or goals, and who are capable of
establishing norms of ethical behavior for themselves.  Corporations, subsidi-
aries, even departments or informal units within an organization, along with
partnerships, professional groups, trade associations, and nation states may all
be ISCT communities in the context of a given ethical decision.  In focusing on
communities, ISCT recognizes that norm-governed group activity is a critical
component of economic life.
A major impact of ISCT is to establish that norms are obligatory for dis-
senting members of communities when an authentic norm has been identified
and when it satisfies the other requirements of ISCT given below.  The obliga-
tion stems from the consent given when one acts as a member of a community,
perhaps by accepting the benefits of the community environment.  However,
ISCT imposes some additional requirements on the operation of the commu-
nity.  The community must respect the right of members to withdraw or exit
from group membership.  Thus, a dissenting member of a community who is
distressed about a particular authentic norm may elect to leave the community.
                                                          
82. See, e.g., THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL
CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (1999) [hereinafter DONALDSON & DUNFEE, TIES
THAT BIND]; Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Integrative Social Contracts Theory: A Com-
munitarian Conception of Economic Ethics, 11 ECON. & PHIL. 85 (1995) [hereinafter Donaldson &
Dunfee, Communitarian]; Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Towards a Unified Conception of
Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252 (1994) [hereinafter
Donaldson & Dunfee, ISCT].  The description of ISCT used here tracks closely with Thomas W. Dun-
fee, International Business Ethics, in THE IEBM HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 264
(Rosalie L. Tung ed., 1999).
83. DONALDSON & DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND, supra note 82, at 41-43.
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Employees may, and generally should, leave a corporation whose values are
significantly at odds with important personal values.  Similarly, an individual
should have the opportunity to exercise voice within the community.  This no-
tion is consistent with much of the organizational justice literature documenting
employee attitudes about procedural justice.  Often, some form of voice (for
example, the right to a hearing to present one’s side of the case or to confront
an accuser) is critical to employee judgments that a firm has acted justly.  A
norm meeting these requirements is considered “authentic.”84
To avoid excessive relativism, and with the recognition that communities do
indeed develop authentic norms supporting race- and gender-based discrimina-
tion as well as other problematic practices, it is assumed in ISCT that the origi-
nal contractors wish to recognize a limited set of universal principles that con-
strain the relativism of community moral free space.  Accordingly, the third
term of the macrosocial contract states as follows: “In order to become obliga-
tory (legitimate), a microsocial contract norm must be compatible with hyper-
norms.”85  Hypernorms are defined as “principles so fundamental to human
existence that . . . we would expect them to be reflected in a convergence of re-
ligious, philosophical, and cultural beliefs.”86  As expressed by Michael Walzer,
they would be a thin “set of standards to which all societies can be held—
negative injunctions, most likely, rules against murder, deceit, torture, oppres-
sion, and tyranny.”87
Hypernorms thus bind the moral free space of communities.  If, for exam-
ple, a hypernorm prohibiting coarse bribery exists,88 then any authentic norm
recognizing bribery among, for example, a community of corrupt government
officials in Russia is not legitimate ipso facto.  A norm meeting the hypernorm
requirement is considered “legitimate.”89  However, hypernorms do not provide
a complete bounding of the moral free space of communities.  There may still
be a conflict between two or more norms that are legitimate.  Accordingly, the
fourth term of the macrosocial context provides that “[i]n cases of conflicts
among norms satisfying microsocial contract terms 1-3, priority must be estab-
lished through the application of rules consistent with the spirit and letter of
the macrosocial contract.”90
Often, multiple, legitimate norms that are applicable to the same ethical
judgment come into conflict.  This may happen when a transaction crosses two
distinctly different communities, as is often the case in global business transac-
tions.  Cultures may have quite different norms concerning what constitutes
                                                          
84. Authentic norms are discussed infra Part III.C.
85. DONALDSON & DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND, supra note 82, at 44.
86. Donaldson & Dunfee, ISCT, supra note 82, at 265.
87. Moral Minimalism, in FROM THE TWILIGHT OF PROBABILITY: ETHICS AND POLITICS 3, 9
(William  R. Shea & Antonio Spadafora eds., 1992).
88. See Thomas W. Dunfee et al., Social Contracts and Marketing Ethics, 63 J. MARKETING 14
(July 1999).
89. Determining what is a hypernorm is discussed infra Part III.C.
90. DONALDSON & DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND, supra note 82, at 46.
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appropriate corporate behavior.  For example, in the United States, corporate
philanthropy is well established, but in certain Asian countries, corporate char-
ity may not be considered proper.  If both the pro- and anti-philanthropy norms
are clearly authentic, then both are presumably legitimate because neither vio-
lates a hypernorm.  How is this conflict to be resolved?  To resolve problems of
this type, ISCT specifies a loose set of six priority rules:
(1)  Transactions solely within a single community, which do not have significant ad-
verse effects on other humans or communities, should be governed by host commu-
nity norms;
(2)  Community norms for resolving priority should be applied, so long as they do not
have significant adverse effects on other humans or communities;
(3)  The more extensive the community which is the source of the norm, the greater
the priority which should be given to the norm;
(4)  Norms essential to the maintenance of the economic environment in which the
transaction occurs should have priority over norms potentially damaging to that envi-
ronment;
(5)  Where multiple conflicting norms are involved, patterns of consistency among
the alternative norms provide a basis for prioritization; and
(6)  Well-defined norms should ordinarily have priority over more general, less pre-
cise norms.91
The implications of this contractarian analysis for corporate governance in a
market with morality are relatively straightforward.  Managers have an obliga-
tion, based in social contract, to respond to mandatory marketplace morality
reflected in legitimate, authentic norms.  Where marketplace morality is in-
stead permissive, managers are acting within moral free space and have a range
of choice as to how they may act.  In all actions, managers are bound by hyper-
norms reflected in manifest universal norms or principles.  Obligations thus
may vary on the basis of specific authentic norms.  Before spelling out the im-
plications for corporate governance, we must briefly consider the instrumental
justification for paying attention to marketplace morality.
Even if marketplace morality supports the monotonic position, the presence
of morality within consumer and capital markets still has implications for the
committed monotonic manager.  If a manager fails to react to conspicuous signs
of moral expectations for her firm, she may implement strategies doomed to
underperform or even produce losses for the firm.  Both outcomes will have a
negative impact on shareholder wealth.  Consider again the example of the ex-
perience of Shell with the Brent Spar.  Shell’s managers may have detracted
from shareholder wealth by failing to anticipate the impact of marketplace mo-
rality.  They may have thought that the issue of how to dispose of the rig was
merely a technical one.  If so, all they had to do was to explain the science of
the decision to relevant stakeholders.  It turned out to be a very different type
of issue.  A sufficiently significant portion of the public chose to believe Green-
peace and thereby supported actions that prevented Shell from carrying out its
                                                          
91. Donaldson & Dunfee, Communitarian, supra note 82, at 105-06.
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plans.  Public support for Greenpeace occurred even though Greenpeace was
ultimately proven wrong on critical scientific facts.  One explanation for this
seemingly irrational result pertains to the nature of trust, particularly in refer-
ence to decisions affecting the natural environment.  A series of controversial
incidents over time involving Shell,92 coupled with the potential of a conflict of
interest on the part of Shell that stood to profit from actions harmful to the en-
vironment, apparently caused many people to conclude that Shell was acting in
a manner inconsistent with their moral desires.
A similar analysis may be used in reference to the tobacco companies and
to Exxon’s handling of the Valdez oil spill.  The case may be made that the to-
bacco companies failed to discern changing public attitudes about their prod-
uct, particularly in regard to rather cavalier industry attitudes about encourag-
ing teenage smoking.  R. J. Reynolds’s Joe Camel campaign provoked
enormous controversy as being obviously targeted toward children.  In spite of
the protestations of the industry that they had little to do with it, by the mid-
1990s, young smokers were the only group in the United States among whom
smoking was increasing.93  The enormous costs ultimately incurred by the com-
panies as a result of political and legal actions might have been significantly
smaller had the companies acted more responsively when it became clear that
public sentiment was changing.
The infamous grounding and subsequent oil spill of the Exxon Valdez off
the shores of Alaska is a well-known corporate disaster.  The manner in which
Exxon management responded to the spill has been significantly criticized,94
and Exxon was, for a while, the poster child for how not to manage a crisis.
The company allowed unsafe practices, was not prepared to handle quickly a
spill of that type and magnitude in Alaska, issued contradictory statements de-
                                                          
92. Shell has been involved in many controversial incidents; a few of the major events are listed
here.  For a discussion of Shell’s public relations history, see Andrew Rowell, Unlovable Shell, the
Goddess of Oil, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 15, 1997, at 23.  After World War II, Shell manufactured
pesticides on a site in the Rocky Mountains that the U.S. military had previously used to make nerve
gas.  In 1960, a game warden notified Shell of harm to local wildlife that was believed to be caused by
Shell’s activities, but Shell continued operations in the area until 1982.  In 1988 and 1989, Shell opera-
tions caused a discharge of 440,000 gallons of oil into the San Francisco Bay and 150 tons of crude oil
into the River Mersey in the United Kingdom.  Also in the 1980s, Shell refused to comply with a U.N.
and OPEC boycott of oil supplies in South Africa.  See Yvette Cooper & David Orr, When the People
Take on an Oil Giant, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 14, 1995, at 15.  Beginning in the early 1990s, the
Ogoni people in Nigeria demanded that Shell compensate them for damage done to their homeland
caused by Shell’s operations.  See Rowell, supra, at 23.  This situation became a major international
event in 1995, shortly after the Brent Spar incident, when the Nigerian military government executed
Ken Saro-Wiwa, an Ogoni leader protesting Shell’s activities, and eight others.  The eight had been
convicted by the Nigerian government for the murder of opposition tribal leaders.  The Nigerian action
was very controversial and drew worldwide condemnation.  Shell failed to intervene or condemn the
actions of the Nigerian government, and many alleged that Shell had supported the military regime.
See Cooper & Orr, supra, at 15.
93. See S. PRAKASH SETHI & PAUL STEIDLMEIER, UP AGAINST THE CORPORATE WALL: CASES
IN BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 346 (6th ed. 1997).
94. See Beth Goodpaster, Case: Exxon Valdez: Corporate Recklessness on Trial, in  POLICIES AND
PERSONS: A CASEBOOK IN BUSINESS ETHICS 369 (Kenneth E. Goodpaster & Laura L. Nash eds., 3d
ed. 1998).
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fending its actions, did not send senior leadership to the site immediately af-
terward, and was accused of appearing arrogant about its responsibility for the
incident.95  Exxon paid more than $3.4 billion in direct charges, was subject to
boycotts (for example, some holders cut up their credit cards and returned
them to the company), and ultimately was assessed more than five billion dol-
lars in punitive damages in a 1994 lawsuit.96  Again, the failure to respond ade-
quately to the moral desires in the market cost shareholders.
C.  Principles for Respecting Marketplace Morality
The following four guiding principles for managers derive from the norma-
tive and instrumental justifications for respecting marketplace morality.  They
are not based on assumptions concerning the specific nature of marketplace
morality.  Instead, they are open to whatever output occurs with an expectation
that marketplace morality will change over time.  The four principles are the
following:
(1)  There is a presumption that all corporate actions must be under-
taken to maximize shareholder wealth;
(2)  Managers must respond to and anticipate existing and changing
marketplace morality relevant to the firm that may have a negative im-
pact on shareholder wealth;
(3)  The presumption in Principle One may be rebutted where clear and
convincing evidence exists that marketplace morality relevant to the
firm would justify a decision that cannot be shown to maximize share-
holder wealth directly; and97
(4)  Managers must act consistently with hypernorms (manifest universal
norms and principles).98
Principle 1.  Maximize Shareholder Wealth as a First Duty.  This principle is
supported in law, agency principles, property rights, and moral analysis of the
corporation.97  It is the core of the monotonic approach.  Yet the basic
obligation to generate profits for shareholders is recognized in most pluralistic
approaches.  Note that Principle One requires shareholder wealth
maximization as a first duty, not as the sole duty.  Remembering Milton
Friedman’s qualification—”while conforming to the basic rules of the society,
both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom”98—even
committed monotonists recognize it only as a first duty, albeit a strong and
dominating one.  The dispute between the monotonists and pluralists concerns
the circumstances and extent to which the first duty may be overridden, not
whether there is such a duty.  This underlying agreement is recognized here by
                                                          
95. See id.
96. See Keith Schneider, Exxon is Ordered to Pay $5 Billion for Alaska Spill , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1994, at 1.
97. See supra Part II.
98. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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creating a rebuttable presumption in favor of shareholder wealth maximization.
The next two principles specify the circumstances in which marketplace
morality may overcome the presumption.  The fourth principle then indicates
the limits placed on both marketplace morality and shareholder wealth
maximization by manifest universal ethical norms and principles.
Principle 2.  Respond to Market Signals Concerning Moral Preferences.  The
discussion thus far has emphasized how the interaction between marketplace
morality and corporate decisionmaking can have either a beneficial or negative
impact on shareholder wealth.  To the extent that this is true, the critical issue
becomes how to identify marketplace morality with sufficient specificity to
enable responsive strategies.  The search must begin with an identification of
the relevant communities in which marketplace morality will be contained.
The key place to look is in markets directly relevant to the firm.  These would
include, for example, consumer markets targeted by the firm, labor markets
from which the firm hires, and capital markets tapped by the firm.
The second question is what to look for.  Marketplace morality will be re-
flected in what was described earlier as authentic norms.99  Authentic norms
represent a consensus pertaining to the propriety of particular actions based on
aggregate attitudes and behaviors of individuals within a particular community.
An example is the norm held by the television industry, and also apparently the
public, that firms selling hard liquor should not advertise on television.  This
norm was observed for many years through the voluntary behavior of the in-
dustry.  However, as demonstrated when Seagram broke with the long-standing
norm and advertised on television in 1996, such norms may be malleable and
susceptible to change.
Donaldson and I suggest the following process for identifying important
moral norms:
An authentic norm may be presumed to exist on the basis of the following:
(1)  Many people in the community believe it exists and are able to express it in
words;
(2)  Inclusion in a formal professional code;
(3)  Inclusion in a corporate code;
(4)  Commonly listed in the media as an ethical standard for the relevant commu-
nity;
(5)  Commonly referred to as an ethical standard by business leaders; and
(6)  Identified as a standard in competent opinion surveys.
The more sources which support a particular candidate for an authentic norm, the
stronger the presumption in its favor.  The presumption in favor of authentic norm
status may be overcome on the basis of:
(1)  Evidence of substantial deviance from the putative norm;
                                                          
99. See supra Part IV.B.
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(2)  Evidence of an inconsistent or contrary norm in the same community;
(3)  Evidence of coercion relating to the norm within the relevant community; and
(4)  Evidence of deception influencing the emergence or evolution of the norm.
The more proxies supporting the existence of an authentic norm, the stronger the con-
trary evidence required to conclude that the norm is, in fact, ersatz.
The type of evidence required for these judgments will generally be commonly
known and readily available.  It will not require an elaborate amount of research.
The presumption will not result in perfect judgments, and there is always some chance
of either failing to identify a genuine authentic norm, or of pronouncing ersatz norms
to be authentic.  On the other hand, we would expect that the prima facie norms rec-
ognized on the basis of the presumption will generally hold up if subjected to an ex
post test.  Nor do such tests have to be complicated, expensive, or elaborate.  Com-
mon  techniques such as the use of focus groups chosen as a valid sample of the target
community may be used to test the authenticity of putative norms.100
One result of this search may be to discover that the various markets rele-
vant to a given firm send conflicting signals regarding moral preferences.  For
example, the morality of the firm’s investors may be at odds with the market
morality within labor or consumer markets relevant to the firm.  Such a conflict
may be resolved by evaluating the issue in the context of the morality existing
in a broader market that subsumes the competing sub-markets.  Thus, if the is-
sue is workplace or product safety, the broader political community may have
discernible, clear-cut authentic norms that would establish a priority among any
competing norms in the sub-market.  If no resolution is provided by looking to
a broader community, then management must assess the relative importance of
the different markets in the context of the firm’s ability to achieve its goals.
There should not be a serious problem of incommensurability because, under
Principle Two, the ultimate test is the welfare of shareholders.
It should be stressed that marketplace morality often indicates profit-
making opportunities for the firm.  Taking steps to align the firm with the
moral desires of important consumer or labor market groups may result in en-
hanced sales or recruiting.  Realizing that judgments concerning the profit po-
tential of such opportunities are not crystal clear, particular leeway should be
given to managers who experiment with reaching these special markets.
There may be circumstances in which a decision may initially appear to
maximize shareholder wealth, such as Exxon taking a hard defensive position
immediately after the Valdez incident, or R. J. Reynolds actively seeking new
smokers by finding ways to encourage pre-teens to experiment with smoking.
But the action, when considered against evidence of marketplace morality,
foreseeably may hurt shareholders in the long run.  In such circumstances,
managers have an obligation to search for evidence of conflicting morality and
to bring their actions into conformity with that of dominant authentic norms.
Again, here, the test is the ultimate welfare of shareholders.
                                                          
100. DONALDSON & DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND, supra note 82, at 105-06 (numbered list different
from bulleted list in original; changes reflect journal conventions).
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Principle 3.  Justify Actions that Fail to Maximize Shareholder Wealth.   Next,
one considers the pluralist arguments that managers have an ethical or social
obligation to act to satisfy objectives other than maximizing shareholder
wealth.  Following the principles presented here helps to resolve many of these
issues.  Where there is clear-cut evidence of marketplace morality in support of
common practices, the practices are perfectly permissible101 even though they
cannot be shown to enhance shareholder wealth.  A good example is the wide-
spread and long-standing acceptance of corporate philanthropy.  Recognized at
law and supported by well-established and recognized custom, philanthropy is
unquestionably supported by an authentic norm.102  Despite the neoclassical
economic claims that “spending money on corporate giving is wrong because it
represents a waste of corporate assets,”103 the practice is clearly justifiable
under this analysis.  Presumably, this conclusion extends even to giving money
to charity in times of operating losses.  Ben & Jerry’s, following the practice of
many other firms, gave $255,384 to charity in 1994, a year in which it incurred
operating losses.104
More difficult is the case of the pluralistic manager who wishes to act on
behalf of stakeholders on the basis of criteria other than that corresponding to
clearly evident community morality.105  The business ethics literature suggests
various criteria that might be used as a rationale for incorporating the interests
of stakeholders into corporate decisionmaking.  The most elaborate among the
attempts at justification is based upon Kantian-derived stakeholder rights, par-
ticularly in the work of Evan and Freeman.106  Donaldson and Preston suggest,
but do not detail, a foundation which is based upon property rights and which
recognizes that stakeholders possess certain rights that may compete or inter-
relate with those possessed by shareholders.107  Earlier, Donaldson used a social
contract theory as a means of “either replacing or augmenting the stakeholder
model” in his treatment of international business ethics.108
Assume then that our pluralistic manager wishes to follow a Kantian analy-
sis and in so doing acts in a manner that is inconsistent with both the assumed
                                                          
101. The practices are not permissible, of course, if they violate manifest universal ethical norms or
principles.  See discussion infra of Principle 4.
102. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
103. Rikki Abzug & Natalie J. Webb, Rational and Extra-Rational Motivations for Corporate Giv-
ing: Complementing Economic Theory with Organizational Science, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1035, 1035
(1997).
104. See Robert John Schulze, Book Note, Can This Marriage Be Saved?  Reconciling Progressiv-
ism with Profits in Corporate Governance Laws,  49 STAN. L. REV. 1607, 1612 (1997).
105. Goodpaster incorporates a “Nemo Dat Principle” into his discussion of stakeholder synthesis
and notes that investors cannot expect managers to act on their behalf in a manner “that would be in-
consistent with the reasonable ethical expectations of the community.”  Goodpaster, supra note 19, at
68.
106. See William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corpora-
tion: Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 75 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E.
Bowie eds., 4th ed. 1993).
107. See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory for the Corporation: Con-
cepts, Evidence, Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65 (1995).
108. THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 47 (1989).
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or actual wishes of the shareholders and the clearly evident marketplace mo-
rality.109  Such an approach is directly inconsistent with Principles Two and
Three.  A purposeful strategy of acting inconsistently with shareholder wealth
maximization and marketplace morality is highly problematic.
On the other hand, marketplace morality may often be permissive rather
than mandatory: The moral desires of people in markets relevant to the firm
may support a system that allows managers to act on their own morality in
many circumstances.  Donaldson and I refer to this as the domain of “moral
free space,” in which one makes choices based upon community norms and
personal values.110  The Merck example follows this approach.  It was certainly
neither legally nor morally mandatory that Merck develop and then give away
Mectizan.  But it was permissible on both counts.  There is no evidence that
Merck’s actions were inconsistent with the marketplace morality of any of its
relevant communities.
Principle 4.  Act Consistently with Mandatory Hypernorms.  There is one
circumstance where following marketplace morality or the monotonic approach
to shareholder wealth maximization is problematic: when the action violates
what Donaldson and I have characterized as hypernorms.111  As discussed
above, hypernorms are second-order norms,112 which serve to judge, and if nec-
essary invalidate, local laws and local morality.  Hypernorms “entail princi-
ples . . . fundamental to human existence. . . .  As such, we would expect them
to be reflected in a convergence of religious, philosophical, and cultural be-
liefs.”113  This is a high standard for a set of universal principles, and, presuma-
bly, the number and scope of such standards would be limited.  Consider the
example of selling carcinogen-contaminated pajamas in poor countries with in-
sufficient background institutions to control the sale of such products.114  This
strategy for disposing of the product may well increase shareholder wealth and
overseas sales and may not violate clearly identifiable marketplace morality in
the firm’s relevant markets.  On the other hand, the product is prohibited for
sale in the United States and in Europe and is potentially harmful to the in-
tended users.  Taking De George’s first principle—multinationals should do no
intentional direct harm unless there is a cardinal overriding justification 115—as a
hypernorm, it becomes the obligation of all organizations to recognize this
principle in regard to stakeholders.
                                                          
109. Presumably such cases will be rare; Kantian morality typically should be congruent with mar-
ketplace morality in relevant communities.
110. DONALDSON & DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND, supra note 82, at 38-41; Donaldson & Dunfee,
ISCT, supra note 82, at 260.
111. See supra Part III.B.
112. By second-order, we mean higher.  Thus, first-order norms are judged by, and are inferior to,
second-order norms.
113. Donaldson & Dunfee, ISCT, supra note 82, at 265.
114. See RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, COMPETING WITH INTEGRITY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
46 (1993).
115. See id.
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Again, Donaldson and I suggest the use of presumptions as a means of iden-
tifying relevant hypernorms.116  We suggest that
[i]f two or more of the following types of evidence confirm widespread recognition
of an ethical principle, the decision maker should operate on the basis of a rebuttable
presumption that it constitutes a hypernorm.  The more types of evidence in support
of a hypernorm, the stronger the presumption.
Evidence in support of a principle having hypernorm status:
(1)  Widespread consensus that the principle is universal;
(2)  Component of well-known global industry standards;
(3)  Supported by prominent non-governmental organizations such as the Interna-
tional Labor Organization or Transparency International;
(4)  Supported by regional government organizations such as the European Com-
munity, the OECD, or the Organization of American States;
(5)  Consistently referred to as a global ethical standard by international media;
(6)  Known to be consistent with precepts of major religions;
(7)  Supported by global business organizations such as the International Chamber
of Commerce or the Caux Round Table;
(8)  Known to be consistent with precepts of major philosophies;
(9)  Generally supported by a relevant international community of professionals,
e.g., accountants or environmental engineers;
(10)  Known to be consistent with empirical findings concerning universal human
values; and
(11)  Supported by the laws of many different countries.
Once having gone through these steps and having identified a presumptive hyper-
norm, the decision maker needs to consider whether evidence exists to overcome the
presumption.  If two or more of the following are found, then the presumption may be
rebutted.  However, the more types of evidence that support the presumption in favor
of hypernorm status, the more types of evidence necessary to override the presump-
tion.
Evidence countering the hypernorm presumption:
(1)  Evidence from the presumptive list to the contrary, e.g., that the putative hy-
pernorm principle does not represent a universal value;
(2)  Evidence from the presumptive list in support of hypernorm status for a mutu-
ally exclusive principle; and
(3)  A decision context such that applying the presumptive hypernorm could result
in the violation of a widely recognized human right.117
The marketplace morality approach places a high standard on those manag-
ers who wish to use a claim of stakeholder interests or general morality to act in
a manner that is inconsistent with maximization of shareholder wealth.  It re-
quires that managers do more than just assert a consistency between their ac-
                                                          
116. See DONALDSON & DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND, supra note 82, at 60-61.
117. See id.
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tions and moral obligation.118  Instead, they should develop justifications in ad-
vance and stand ready to defend their stakeholder-based actions with evidence
that supports the existence of hypernorms or objective evidence that validates
marketplace morality.
V
THE IMPLICATIONS OF MARKETPLACE MORALITY FOR LAW AND PUBLIC
POLICY
A major foundation for a marketplace morality-based analysis is the liberty
of individuals to hold moral desires and to seek to implement them in their
daily decisionmaking.  For some people, implementing their moral desires is
the most significant element of their lives.  All people should have a maximal
opportunity to act as they prefer in this domain.  Individuals who act on the ba-
sis of their moral desires may implement them through a wide variety of eco-
nomic, political, and social channels.  They may vote consistently with their de-
sires, lobby legislatures, boycott products, support social issue shareholder
resolutions, buy or sell stock in certain firms, persuade friends and strangers to
act in a similar way, and so on.  Individuals also face many constraints in exer-
cising their moral desires, particularly in the form of restrictive public policy
and laws.  Because there are many competing moral desires in political and so-
cial markets, this is to be expected.  Those who find themselves blocked in one
channel (for example, legal interpretations of corporate governance standards
or restrictions limiting social issue shareholder resolutions) may turn to other
channels (for example, lobbying for legislation or boycotts) as a means of giv-
ing effect to their preferences.  Among the many channels susceptible to moral
desires, the securities markets appear to be among the most open.  One may
buy and sell securities, at least for oneself, on the basis of whatever criteria one
chooses.
As a general matter, supporting disclosure and individual choice in support
of a marketplace of ideas is consistent with American traditions and ideals.  As
Oliver Wendell Holmes, dissenting in Abrams v. United States, put it so nicely:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out.  That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.119
The concept of marketplace morality is also consistent with the concept of
reflexive law, which seeks to provide access to information and documentation
                                                          
118. The emphasis on objective or manifest evidence is responsive to the concerns of critics such as
Schulze who worry that the pluralistic proposals are “unworkable because they eliminate much of the
guidance for managerial decision making.  Under [the pluralistic] reforms, executives would be free to
manage corporations based on caprice or bias.  Moreover, the proposals leave no objective legal stan-
dard by which to judge and evaluate managerial performance.”  Schulze, supra note 104, at 1612.
119. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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of statements toward supporting decisions by private actors.120  On the other
hand, marketplace morality is not consistent with the idea of legal endorsement
of inauthentic norms.  For example, it is not clear that the implied contract for
job security argued for by O’Connor,121 which would require directors to act as
mediators between stockholders and employees, would meet the test of authen-
tic norms.
Bowles suggests that the structure of markets and background institutions
may have a significant effect on the preferences of those who participate in the
markets or are subject to its institutions.122  This idea seems correct, and it has
very significant implications.  Preferences are not hard-wired to the individual
such that they are independent of the external environment.  Policies should be
judged, in part, on the basis of their likely impact on citizens’ moral desires and
also their ability to give effect to those desires.
The extreme monotonic view, implemented through the business judgment
rule, would have the effect of denying managers the ability to respond to mar-
ketplace morality and might, in certain circumstances, result in managers vio-
lating mandatory hypernorms.  This view can be expected to influence the
moral desires of the managers themselves.  And, by deafening managers to
marketplace morality, it would make it more difficult for individuals to assert
their moral desires.  These reasons, supported by the social contracts approach
described above, require that the business judgment rule and other relevant
policies be interpreted consistently with the four guiding principles:
(1)  There is a presumption that all corporate actions must be under-
taken to maximize shareholder wealth;
(2)  Managers must respond to and anticipate existing and changing
marketplace morality relevant to the firm that may have a negative im-
pact on shareholder wealth;
                                                          
120. See David W. Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Respon-
siveness, 25 J. CORP. LAW (forthcoming 2000).  See generally Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental
Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995).  Reflexive laws can be distinguished from “substantive” law on
how they, as regulatory schemes, take responsibility for the outcome of social activity.  Substantive law
essentially mandates a certain outcome, while reflexive law preserves the freedom of regulated parties
to reach their own outcomes but establishes procedures that will force those parties to “take account of
various externalities.”  Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. &
SOC. REV. 239, 255-57 (1983).  Orts argues for environmental audits as a reflexive law alternative to
substantive regulation (for example, command-control regulation) because they work toward institu-
tionalizing environmental responsibility within corporations.  See Orts, supra, at 1339.  Similar to the
National Environmental Policy Act, which requires agencies to prepare environmental impact state-
ments, environmental audits operate on the assumption that the process of preparing an audit will
promote responsible decisionmaking.  See id. at 1272-75.  Some of the key components of an environ-
mental audit regulatory scheme are third-party verification and public disclosure.  See id. at 1322-24.
Similar to securities regulation, these requirements promote more efficient markets by giving the mar-
ket participants more information.  See id. at 1312.
121. Marleen A. O’Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring the Fiduci-
ary/Contract Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit Employment Agreements, in PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW 235 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); see also Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human
Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993).
122. See generally Bowles, supra note 57.
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(3)  The presumption in Principle One may be rebutted where clear and
convincing evidence exists that marketplace morality relevant to the
firm would justify a decision that cannot be shown to maximize share-
holder wealth directly; and
(4)  Managers must act consistently with hypernorms (manifest universal
norms and principles).123 
VI
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the existence and nature of marketplace morality provides in-
sights concerning the extent to which firm managers should consider the inter-
ests of stakeholders.  Managers will more effectively satisfy their primary duty
to shareholders when they respond to signals of significant moral preferences
within capital, consumer, and labor markets relevant to the firm.  Managers
have a further obligation, based on a social contract, to act consistently with
mandatory marketplace morality and manifest universal norms.
                                                          
123. See supra Part IV.C.
